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increases the risk of income tax audits, and opens firms up to adverse impact lawsuits.  
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Originality/value – Tipping has received little attention in service marketing. 
Furthermore, there is no good, published source of guidance to help service industry 
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and its alternatives from a business perspective.   
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Tipping and Its Alternatives: 
Business Considerations and Directions for Research 
 
 Service consumers often leave voluntary payments of money – “tips” – for the 
workers who served them. Among the services workers commonly tipped in the United 
States are bartenders, bellhops, casino croupiers, concierges, delivery people, doormen, 
golf caddies, limousine drivers, maître d’s, massage therapists, parking valets, porters, 
restaurant musicians, washroom attendants, shoeshine boys, taxicab drivers, and tour 
guides (Star, 1988). Although not as widespread as in the United States, tipping is also 
practiced in most countries around the world (Star, 1988). 
 Consumers’ decisions about whom and how to tip are largely determined by 
custom. However, service industry executives and managers need not passively accept 
the dictates of custom. They can encourage tipping by allowing employees to accept tips, 
placing tip jars in visible locations, and posting messages like “Gratuities Appreciated” 
on menus, table tents, checks and/or public signs. Conversely, they can discourage 
tipping by prohibiting employees from accepting tips, adding automatic service charges 
to bills, and posting messages like “Tipping Not Necessary” on menus, table tents, checks 
and/or public signs. In fact, many cruise lines (Engle, 2004),  resorts (Evans & Dave, 
1999), and private clubs (Club Managers Association of America, 1996), as well as some 
hotels (Rihards and Rosato, 1995) and restaurants (Ortega, 1998) have used these or 
similar practices to actively manage the tipping behavior at their establishments. Last 
year, for example, chef/owner Thomas Keller replaced tipping with an automatic 20 
percent service charge at Per Se -- a highly regarded French restaurant in New York City 
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(Shaw, 2005). The year before that, Holland America Line abandoned its decades old 
tipping policy in favor of daily service charges (Engle, 2004). 
 The ability to actively manage customers’ tipping behavior raises questions about 
how tipping policy decisions should be made. What are the business functions of tipping? 
When should tipping be allowed and when not? If tipping is abandoned, should it be 
replaced with service charges or with service-inclusive prices? Unfortunately, executives 
and managers in the service industry have few places to go for the answers to these 
questions. Tipping has received very little attention in the services marketing literature 
(see Koku, 2005, for a rare exception). The purpose of this paper is to outline the 
business issues surrounding tipping and its alternatives, to summarize what we know 
about those issues, and to identify questions in need of further research. Thus, this paper 
should provide service industry executives and managers with information and guidance 
regarding tipping policies and should provide services marketing scholars with an agenda 
for future research. The report is structured around eight major issues –  
• consumer preferences,  
• price partitioning,  
• price discrimination,  
• server incentives,  
• pay levels,  
• employee recruitment and retention,  
• income tax evasion, and   
• employment discrimination.  
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After all the issues are discussed and questions for future research are identified, a final 
section summarizes the issues and offers suggestions about how executives and managers 
can integrate them to arrive at a reasonable tipping policy.  
Consumer Preferences 
 Tipping policies are a feature of service products that may be viewed favorably or 
unfavorably by consumers. Indeed, scholars have argued that tipping provides tippers 
direct psychological benefits such as a reduction in tippers’ anxieties about being the 
target of servers’ envy (Foster, 1972; Lynn, 1994), a reduction in tippers’ feelings of guilt 
about the status and power inequalities between themselves and servers (Shamir, 1984), 
an increase in the social recognition and status of big tippers (Lynn, 1997; Paules, 1991), 
an increase in tippers’ self-perceived freedom (Shamir, 1984), and an increase in tippers’ 
positive feelings from helping servers (Shamir, 1984). However, tipping also separates 
the payment for service from that of accompanying products (e.g., food, accommodation, 
transportation, etc...) and research on decision making has found that such separation of 
payments or losses increases the psychological pain of those losses relative to the pain of 
a single loss of comparable magnitude (Thaler, 1985). Moreover, tipping puts unwelcome 
social pressures on many consumers to part with money they would rather keep (Crespi, 
1947; Seagrave, 1998). Though less scholarly attention has been devoted to service 
charges and service-inclusive pricing than to tipping, the former policies undoubtedly 
provide their own set of psychological benefits and costs. The net effects of all these 
psychological benefits and costs should be reflected in consumers’ attitudes towards the 
different policies. 
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 Surveys about consumers’ attitudes toward tipping and its alternatives that have 
been conducted in the United States over past thirty years indicate that a majority of 
consumers prefer guaranteed server wages (implying service-inclusive pricing) over 
voluntary tipping and voluntary tipping over service charges (see Table 1). Research is 
needed to assess the impact of these preferences on consumers’ patronage behavior. 
However, there are two reasons for expecting that effect to be small. First, psychologists 
have found that general attitudes, like those concerning tipping and its alternatives, 
typically have only weak effects on behavior (Myers, 1994). There are simply too many 
other factors influencing behavior for attitudes to strongly predict behavior. Second, 
consumers’ preferences about tipping policies do not appear to be all that strong. For 
example, 77 percent of U.S. respondents to a 1989 telephone survey did not favor service 
charges, but only 34 percent of U.S. respondents to a 1987 telephone survey thought a 15 
to 18 percent service charge was unreasonable (see Table 1). Similarly, 44 percent of 
U.S. respondents to a 2004 internet survey would prefer to have waiters/waitresses paid 
higher wages instead of tips, but only 11 percent of those same respondents disliked 
tipping (see Table 1). Given that consumers’ preferences appear to be weak and are 
unlikely to have strong effects on patronage behavior, they need not dictate tipping 
policies. 
take in Table I 
 Price Partitioning 
 Tipping and service charges both separate (or partition) the price of service from 
that of accompanying products such as food, accommodation or transportation, while 
service-inclusive pricing bundles these prices together. A similar point about payments 
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was made in the previous section. Here, the focus is not on payments but on pricing – a 
subtle but important distinction. In discussing this issue, it will be helpful to differentiate 
nominal prices from real prices. Nominal prices constitute only part of the final bill, 
which also comprises hidden surcharges such as taxes, service charges or tips. The prices 
on most restaurant menus, for example, are nominal prices as is the case with most hotel 
room rates and cruise fares. In contrast, real prices are the total costs to consumers of 
goods and services including all hidden surcharges. Nominal prices are generally lower 
with tipping and service charges, because tips and service charges cover some labor costs 
that would otherwise add to nominal prices. By lowering nominal prices via tipping and 
service charges, service firms can reduce distribution costs and increase demand as 
discussed next.  
Reduces Distribution Costs  
 Commissions paid to travel agents, tour operators, and/or off-line distributors 
(such as Expedia) are based on a percentage of the sales they generate. With tipping and 
service charges, lower nominal prices reduce sales figures, so commission payments are 
not as high as they might otherwise be. The benefits are difficult to see because they are 
accompanied by those reduced sales figures, but they are real. The following hypothetical 
calculation shows why.   
 Say that an organization that uses service-inclusive pricing generates $100 in 
sales with transactions that involve labor costs of $30 and other production and marketing 
costs of $40. Further assume the organization must pay a 5% commission to distributors.  
Under the service-inclusive pricing system, the firm makes a profit of $25 on $100 in 
sales -- $100 (sales) - $30 (labor costs) - $40 (other production and marketing costs) - $5 
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(5% commissions) = $25 (profit). Now assume that $20 of labor costs are covered by tips 
or service charges and that nominal prices are reduced accordingly. Sales and labor costs 
fall, while everything else (including the actual number of transactions) remains the 
same. In this case, sales drop to $80, labor costs fall to $10, other production costs remain 
at $40, and the 5 percent commission is $4. Thus, the firm is making a profit of $26.00 on 
$80 in sales --$80 (sales) - $10 (labor costs) - $40 (other production and marketing costs) 
- $4.00 (5% commissions) = $26.00 (profit). In this hypothetical case, tipping and/or 
service charges increased profits by 4 percent on the same volume of business. (Stated 
sales declined due to lower nominal prices, not lower volume.)  
 While the specific numbers in this hypothetical case do not generalize, the 
underlying logic does. When labor costs are built into prices, companies must pay 
percentage commissions on higher sales figures. By reducing sales figures and, therefore, 
the commissions paid to distributors, tipping and service charges increase profits. 
Obviously, this increase in profits is greater the greater the commissions paid to 
distributors. 
Increases Demand
  Consumers may focus on nominal (rather than real prices) as they compare the 
expense of competing services. If they do so, the lower nominal prices made possible by 
tipping or service charges should improve competitiveness and increase demand. 
However, if consumers instead focus on real prices when comparing service providers, 
then lower nominal prices will not improve competitiveness. The question is whether 
consumers compare the nominal prices or the real prices of services. Research is needed 
to answer this question and to determine the influence of tipping and alternative policies 
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on consumers’ perceptions of how expensive a service is. Until that research is 
conducted, however, executives and managers can take guidance from general theory and 
research on decision making, which suggests that people do focus on nominal prices 
when assessing expensiveness.  
 Researchers have found that the easier information is to acquire and use, the more 
likely it will actually be applied in decision making (Moorman, 1990; Simon, 1957). 
Nominal prices are generally more accessible than real prices because nominal prices are 
explicitly stated while real prices include add on charges that are often hidden. Even 
when add on charges are not hidden, they are often presented in a format (such as 
percentages) that makes their use more difficult for consumers. Thus, the principles of 
accessibility and ease of use suggest that consumers use nominal prices more than real 
prices when making judgments about expensiveness. In addition, researchers have found 
that when people subjectively adjust an initial judgment they almost always make too 
small an adjustment (Plous, 1993). This means that subjective comparisons of 
expensiveness will be influenced by nominal prices even if people make adjustments for 
add-on costs not factored into their initial assessments.  
 Consistent with the above reasoning, marketing researchers have found that price 
partitioning in non-service contexts sometimes reduces perceived expensiveness and 
increases demand. For example, Morwitz, Greenleaf and Johnson (1998) found that total 
recalled costs of a catalogue order were lower when the shipping and handling fees were 
presented as a separate charge than when they were included in the catalogue prices. In 
another study, they found that auction bidders agreed to pay more in total costs when a 15 
percent auction fee was charged separately than when it was bundled into the bid price. 
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These findings need to be replicated in the context of tipping and service charges, but 
they suggest that firms charging separate fees for their product and service via tipping or 
service charges may be perceived as less expensive than those using all-inclusive pricing. 
It is difficult to quantify the effects on demand of that competitive advantage, but it 
should be larger the greater the price sensitivity of consumers.  
 
Price Discrimination 
 Charging different customers different prices for the same good or service results 
in higher profits when (1) consumers differ in the amounts they are willing to pay, (2) the 
prices charged match the different segments’ willingness to pay, and (3) demand from 
price-insensitive customers is lower than the firm’s production capacity. In that case, 
revenues and profits are maximized by price discrimination because firms extract more 
money from price-insensitive customers without losing the business of price-sensitive 
customers (Hanks, Cross & Noland, 1992). Tipping represents a form of price 
discrimination, because it allows some customers to pay less than other customers for the 
same service. Although all customers must pay the same nominal price for a given 
service, they can differ in the amounts that they tip.  
 As a form of price discrimination, tipping is unique in two respects that deserve 
discussion. First, the price differentials paid under tipping are voluntary. Consequently, 
price-insensitive customers could avoid paying a price premium by tipping as little as do 
price-sensitive customers. Fortunately, research suggests that this does not occur. Price-
insensitivity (or the amount consumers are willing to pay for a service) should increase 
with income and perceptions of value, both of which are associated with larger tips (Lynn 
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& McCall, 2000; Lynn & Thomas-Haysbert, 2003; McCrohan & Pearl, 1983). Thus, 
price-insensitive customers do pay a price premium by tipping more than do their price-
sensitive counterparts. Second, firms do not directly receive revenues from tips as they do 
from other premium prices charged to price-insensitive customers. However, they do 
receive those revenues indirectly in the form of lower labor costs. Since price-sensitive 
customers can and do keep their costs down by tipping less than price-insensitive 
customers, and since the price premiums paid by the price-insensitive customers do go 
indirectly to the service firm, the price discrimination achieved through tipping means 
increased sales and profits as long as the price-sensitive customers are filling seats that 
would otherwise be empty (Schwartz, 1997). 
 When demand from price-sensitive customers is not needed to fill seats, however, 
price discrimination through tipping simply attracts a more diverse customer base without 
enhancing revenues or profits. Therefore, firms enjoying strong demand and seeking a 
relatively exclusive, up-scale clientele may want to replace tipping with service charges 
or service-inclusive pricing as a way to discourage price-sensitive customers. 
     
Server Incentives 
 One set of arguments for tipping involve its supposed incentive for servers to up-
sell menu items and to deliver good service. In contrast, it is thought that service charges 
provide an incentive to up-sell but not to deliver good service, and that service-inclusive 
pricing provides no incentive for either activity. These assumptions are not entirely 
supported as explained next. 
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Incentives for Up-Selling 
 Tips and service charges are both generally calculated as a percentage of the bill, 
so servers who sell more can expect to earn more in tips and service charges (assuming 
that a fixed percentage of service charges go to the server). However, academic theory 
and research indicates that this incentive for up-selling will motivate behavior only if 
servers have a sense of self-efficacy and expect their up-selling efforts to affect 
customers’ orders (Bandura, 1997; McMurrain, Srivastava and Holmes, 2002). More 
research is needed on this issue, but managers should not assume that tipping or service 
charges alone will motivate their staff to up-sell. Feelings of sales competence, which can 
be enhanced through sales training, are also necessary for tipping and service charges to 
increase staff’s selling efforts.  
Incentives for Good Service 
 Economists argue that tipping exists because it is the most efficient way to 
provide service workers with an incentive to deliver good service (e.g., Ben-Zion & 
Karni, 1977; Jacob & Page, 1980). They argue that the intangible and customized nature 
of services makes it difficult and costly for managers to monitor and reward service 
workers’ efforts, so this task is given to the customer via tipping whenever the consumer 
is able to evaluate the service worker’s performance. From this perspective, we do not tip 
physicians, car mechanics, and some other service workers because consumers cannot tell 
in the short term if those workers have done a good job or not. In the case of most 
personal services, however, consumers can evaluate service workers’ performances and 
can do so more efficiently than can firms. In those cases, tipping is supposed to improve 
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service levels by providing workers with a stronger incentive to deliver good service than 
would otherwise be possible. 
 The idea that voluntary tipping policies enhance service levels is important and 
needs to be tested. Although no direct tests of this idea have been published, there are 
numerous studies testing the related idea that consumers tip more for better service. A 
recent meta-analysis of those studies found that the average correlation between bill 
adjusted tips and customers’ evaluations of the service and/or dining experience is only 
.11 (Lynn & McCall, 2000).  This correlation is so small that servers are unlikely to 
notice the effects of service on the tips their customers leave (Lynn & Graves 1996).  
While it is not clear how much the weak service-tipping relationship in restaurants 
generalizes to other service contexts, it does suggest that tipping may not provide as 
strong an incentive to deliver good service as many believe. 
Other Incentives 
 In addition to providing some incentive for the delivery of good service, tipping 
provides an incentive for several undesirable behaviors. First, it encourages servers to 
give less attention to members of groups known to be poor tippers. For example, Blacks 
tip less than Whites in the United States, so many servers dislike waiting on black parties 
and deliver inferior service to those black customers they must serve (Lynn and Thomas-
Haysbert, 2003). Other groups likely to receive reduced attention from U.S. servers under 
a tipping system include foreigners, women, teenagers, the elderly, and anyone bearing 
coupons (Caudill, 2004; Harris, 1995; Lynn, 2004b). Second, tipping encourages servers 
to focus on their own tables and to ignore the needs of other guests. Unless tips are 
pooled (which reduces any incentive for individual effort provided by tipping), helping 
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another server is irrational because it reduces a servers’ ability to attend to his or her own, 
tipping customers. Finally tipping encourages servers to give product to customers free of 
charge. Research has found that customers receiving gifts from servers reciprocate with 
larger tips, so one strategy astute servers use to increase their tips is to give away goods 
and services their employers want them to charge for (Strohmetz, Rind, Fisher & Lynn, 
2002). To my knowledge, there is no research quantifying the negative effects of tipping 
described above. Nevertheless, tipping provides at least as strong an incentive for servers 
to engage in these negative behaviors as it does for servers to deliver good service.  
 In summary, tipping does provide servers with some incentive to up-sell and to 
deliver good service. However, those incentives may not be very strong. Furthermore, 
tipping also provides servers with incentives to ignore some customers and to give away 
product that should be sold. Thus, the value of tipping as a system for motivating servers 
is lower than commonly believed. In particular, service organizations with a large 
clientele of people perceived to be poor tippers – i.e., ethnic minorities, foreigners, 
women, teenagers, the elderly and coupon users -- should look to other means of 
motivating servers to deliver good service. 
Pay Levels 
 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, tipped service workers such as 
bartenders and waiters earn hourly incomes that are roughly the same as those of non-
tipped service workers such as hostesses, fast-food workers, cafeteria counter attendants, 
and dishwashers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). However, tipped employees rarely 
report all their tip income (Internal Revenue Service, 1990), so those statistics may be 
misleading – especially for high-end establishments where tips are very generous. In fact, 
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my own experiences as a tipped employee and my conversations with other people in the 
service industry suggest that many tipped workers earn far more in tips than they could 
possibly earn in wages from other types of work involving similar skill sets. This income 
premium helps to attract and retain good employees in tipped positions. On the other 
hand, it also gives the servers income that might otherwise go to the firm if tipping were 
replaced with service charges or service-inclusive pricing – provided wages were 
adjusted to offset only part of the lost tip income. Another problem with the income 
premium provided by tipping is that it contributes to disparities in the incomes of tipped 
and non-tipped employees, which can create problems with the non-tipped staff. 
Research studying these issues is unavailable and needed. However, executives and 
managers can assess for themselves the extent to which their tipped workers are overpaid 
by comparing the incomes of their tipped and non-tipped staff. Those managers finding 
large discrepancies may want to consider alternative tipping policies in order to 
redistribute income from tipped employees to non-tipped employees or to the bottom 
line. 
Employee Recruitment and Retention 
 As different ways of compensating employees, tipping and it alternatives are 
likely to have different effects on employee recruitment and retention. In particular, 
tipping may have three effects that its alternatives do not. First, tipping may increase the 
quality of applicant pools and service staffs because poor servers come to expect low tip 
incomes and look elsewhere for work (Brauer, 1997; Schotter, 2000). Second, tipping 
may provide a competitive advantage over employers relying on other compensation 
methods in attracting talented servers, because tipping often  results in higher overall pay 
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for servers than is possible under service charges or service-inclusive pricing (see 
previous section on pay levels). Finally, tipping may attract less professional workers 
than do its alternatives, because daily cash payments are more attractive and uncertainty 
about income is less important to young, part-time, and temporary workers than to 
mature, full-time, and long-term workers (Parise, 1987). These effects, though plausible, 
need to be empirically tested.  Until that research is forthcoming, executives and 
managers should simply note that offering higher wages under service charge or service-
inclusive pricing systems will reduce any competitive advantage in attracting workers 
that tipping provides and will increase the likelihood of attracting a more professional 
work force. 
 
Income Tax Evasion 
 Unlike wages, tip income is easy to hide from employers and governments. As a 
result, tipping raises issues about income tax evasion that do arise under service-inclusive 
pricing or service-charge systems. Income tax laws vary across countries and this report 
cannot provide a country by country analysis, so I will limit my discussion of this issue to 
the United States, where the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that about half of 
all tip income is undeclared (Internal Revenue Service, 1990). This under-reporting of tip 
income is both a benefit and a liability to service firms. It benefits service firms because 
the ability to earn undeclared and, therefore, untaxed income effectively raises the wages 
of service workers at the expense of the government rather than that of the service firms. 
In turn, higher wages attract better workers as mentioned previously. Furthermore, 
undeclared tip income effectively reduces the FICA taxes firms pay. This latter point can 
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be a short-term benefit, but also a long-term liability because employers are responsible 
for paying FICA taxes on all the tip income (declared or otherwise) of their employees. If 
the IRS audits a firm and finds undeclared tip income, it can make the firm pay back 
taxes on that income along with penalties and interest. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
recently upheld the use of aggregate tip estimates to calculate employer FICA tax 
liability, so audits are easier for the IRS and more likely for firms than in the past (Mills 
& Mason, 2004). 
 The tax liabilities associated with tipping can be eliminated by participating in 
one of two programs the Internal Revenue Service has set up for increasing tip reporting 
(Mills & Mason, 2004). The Tip Rate Determination Agreement (TDRA) is an 
arrangement in which the IRS agrees not to audit an employer for undeclared tip income 
if the employer gets 75 percent of his or her tipped employees to promise in writing to 
declare tip income equal to some percentage of sales predetermined by the IRS. The Tip 
Reporting Alternative Commitment (TRAC) is a similar arrangement in which the 
employer is freed from audits of tip income in exchange for educating employees every 
quarter about their obligation to report all tip income. Although these programs increase 
tip reporting, they do not completely eliminate under-reporting of tip income. In essence, 
the IRS is agreeing to let firms get away with having employees under-report some of 
their tip income in exchange for having more of it declared than would otherwise occur. 
Thus, service firms participating in these programs can still benefit from the increased 
attractiveness of jobs involving untaxed income while eliminating the tax liabilities of 
having employees who under-report tips.   
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Employment Discrimination 
 Service-inclusive pricing and service charge systems place the compensation of 
employees entirely in the hands of management while voluntary tipping places much of 
employee compensation in the hands of customers. One potential drawback of giving 
customers direct control over employee compensation in this way is that customers may 
discriminate against protected classes of people, which could leave firms open to adverse 
impact discrimination lawsuits. Discrimination laws vary across countries and this report 
cannot cover them all, so I will focus on discrimination law in the United States and its 
implications for tipping. Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (Twomey, 
1998). Furthermore, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits business policies and practices that have a 
disparate impact on protected classes of applicants and employees even if those policies 
and practices appear at face value to be neutral and are not intended to discriminate. 
These laws and court rulings mean that tipping may be an illegal means of compensating 
employees if consumers’ tipping behavior discriminates against protected classes of 
servers.  
 Very little research has examined customer discrimination in tipping, but a few 
studies have examined the effects of server sex and race on tipping. Server sex does not 
affect tipping in every study, but in at least some studies waitresses receive larger tips on 
average than do waiters (Davis, Schrader, Richardson, Kring abd Kiefer, 1998; Lynn & 
McCall, 2000). Server race has also been shown to affect tipping. Black cab drivers 
receive smaller tips on average than do white cab drivers (Ayres, Vars & Zakariya, 
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2003). This is true regardless of the race of the tipper – both black and white tippers give 
white drivers larger tips than black drivers. The studies examining these effects are too 
limited in number and in diversity of settings to support broad generalizations about 
customer sex and race discrimination in tipping. This is another issue in need of further 
research. However, the existing studies do suggest that such discrimination occurs at least 
sometimes and in some places, so at least some service firms may be subject to adverse 
impact, employment discrimination lawsuits. 
 The interpretation of the law described above is new. Certainly, it has not yet been 
tested in the courts. However, the idea that a restaurant would lose a multi-million-dollar 
judgment when a customer spilled coffee on herself also came as a surprise to many 
(Enghagen & Gilardi, 2002). Even though the success of an employment discrimination 
lawsuit based on a claim of disparate impact from tipping is uncertain, large chains 
should take the possibility of such lawsuits seriously because the potential costs of losing 
a class action lawsuit of this nature are very high. To protect themselves against such a 
lawsuit, large chains should test to see if tipping has a disparate impact in their businesses 
and, if it does, should either pool tips or replace tipping with one of its alternatives. 
take in Table II 
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 Weighing the Pros and Cons of Each Option 
 Table II summarizes the issues identified and discussed in this report. All the 
issues are framed as benefits and the extent to which each favors tipping, service charges, 
and/or service-inclusive pricing is indicated via plus or minus signs. Furthermore, the 
conditions under which each benefit is especially strong or important are identified.  
An examination of this table reveals that no one of the policies is always the best. Service 
industry executives and managers need to carefully weigh the pros and cons of each 
policy given their own circumstances. Unfortunately, there is no way to accurately put 
the different benefits on a common objective metric, so decision makers must assign 
subjective weights to each when integrating them into an overall assessment of each 
policy. The need for subjective weightings means that small differences in the overall 
desirability of the different policies should not be given too much credence.  However, if 
the desirability of one policy stands out (positively or negatively) from that of the others, 
then it should be accepted or rejected accordingly. Certainly, basing tipping policies on 
such a careful consideration of all the issues raised in this paper makes more sense than 
unthinking acceptance of local industry norms. 
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Table I  Attitudes toward Tipping and its Alternatives in the United States 
 
Internet Survey  (Lynn, 2004a)
 
I would prefer to have waiters and waitresses paid higher 
wages instead of tips. 
44% Agree 
34% Neutral 
22% Disagree 
 
I dislike having to tip waiters and waitresses. 
11% Agree 
20% Neutral 
69% Disagree 
 
 
 
Telephone Survey by International Communications 
Research (Snaphots, 2002)  
 
How do you feel about the practice of tipping – that is a 
fair way to compensate people who perform various 
services, or that it is unfair to customers to expects them 
to pay extra for services they’ve already paid for. 
73% Fair 
24% Unfair 
3% Don’t Know 
 
Telephone Survey by TNS Intersearch (Paul, 2001) 
 
Under normal circumstances, how do you feel when a tip 
is automatically added to your bill? Are you 
57% Annoyed 
41% Not Anoyed 
1% Don’t Know 
Reader Survey by USA Today (Wildes, Mann & 
DeMicco, 1998)   
 
Which do you prefer – having an automatic service 
charge added to your bill to cover the tip or determining 
for yourself what the tip should be? 
5% Prefer service charge 
95% Prefer tipping 
 
In general, which of the following best describes how you 
feel about tipping? 
86% Favor 
12% Oppose 
 
Telephone Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman 
(Cole, 1989)
 
Would you favor a system under which restaurants would 
add a mandatory service charge of 15 to 18 percent to 
your bill? 
19% Yes 
77% No 
 
Telephone Survey by Gallup (Mills & Riehle, 1987)  
 
Waiter/waitress should receive a guaranteed wage instead 
of tips. 
58% Agree 
13% Neutral 
23% Disagree 
5% Don’t Know 
 
I would like it better if I was not expected to tip at 
restaurants. 
33% Agree 
19% Neutral 
45% Disagree 
3% Don’t Know 
 
A service charge of 15 to 18 percent is reasonable. 
45% Agree 
16% Neutral 
34% Disagree 
5% Don’t Know 
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Table II Summary of the benefits offered by tipping, service charges and/or service-
inclusive pricing. 
Benefit Tipping Service 
Charge 
 
Service-
Inclusive 
Pricing 
Benefit is Especially Strong or 
Important When ... 
Match consumer preferences + - ++ Rarely – preferences are weak and likely 
to have little effect on patronage 
     
Lower distribution costs 
(via lower nominal prices) 
+ + - Commissions paid to distributors are 
high 
     
Increased demand 
(via partitioned prices) 
+ + - Customers are price sensitive – e.g., 
when customers are lower SES 
     
Higher profits  
(via price discrimination) 
+ - - Customers differ in willingness to pay – 
e.g., when customers have diverse SES 
backgrounds 
     
Motivate up-selling + + - Servers are trained how to sell and feel 
competent to do so 
     
Motivate good service + - - Rarely – tips are only weakly related to 
service  
     
Motivate equal service for all 
customers 
- + + Large portion of customer base consists 
of ethnic minorities, foreigners, women, 
teenagers and/or the elderly 
     
Redistribute income from tipped 
staff to non-tipped staff or to the 
bottom line 
- + + Tipped staff make substantially more 
than non-tipped workers – e.g., in up-
scale establishments and in areas with 
generous tipped minimum wages 
     
Attract talented workers  
(due to high income potential) 
+ - - Tips are high relative to wages for other 
jobs  
     
Attract more professional workers 
(due to income certainty) 
- + + Wages are high as well as stable 
     
Lower FICA tax payments + - - Servers fail to declare large amounts of 
tip income 
     
Lower risks from tax audits - + + No TDRA or TRAC agreement has been 
reached with the IRS 
     
Lower risks of adverse impact 
lawsuits 
- + + Tips are not pooled and protected 
classes receive lower tips 
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